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Anonymous voting is a voting method of hiding the link between a vote and a voter, the context
of which ranges from governmental elections to decision making in small groups like councils or
companies. In this paper, we propose a quantum anonymous voting protocol assisted by two kinds
of entangled quantum states. Particularly, we provide a mechanism of opening and permuting
the ordered votes of all the voters in an anonymous manner; any party, who is interested in the
voting results, can acquire a permutation copy, and then obtains the voting result through simple
calculation. Unlike all previous quantum works on anonymous voting, our quantum anonymous
protocol firstly possesses the properties of privacy, self-tallying, non-reusability, verifiability and
fairness at the same time. Besides, we demonstrate that the entanglement of the novel quantum
states used in our protocol makes the attack from outside eavesdropper and inside dishonest voters
impossible. We also generalize our protocol to execute tasks of anonymous multi-party computation,
such as anonymous broadcast and anonymous ranking.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Science of cryptography studies how to prevent valu-
able information from being leaked to unauthorized par-
ties. In practice, most cryptographic protocols are de-
signed to protect messages from being eavesdropped by
an adversary when they are sent from one party to an-
other. However, in some situations, to keep the identity
of message senders private is just as important as to keep
the messages secret. One example is anonymous voting,
in which each voter votes for one of candidates anony-
mously. Therefore, no one but himself or herself could
know which candidate he or she votes. The contexts
of voting range from governmental elections to decision
making in rather small groups like councils or compa-
nies. To be reliable and useful in practice, voting pro-
tocols should have some desirable properties (see [1] for
more details) like privacy, non-resusability, verifiability,
fairness and eligibility as follows.
(1) Privacy. Only the individual voter knows how he
or she votes.
(2) Non-reusablity. Each voter can vote only once and
cannot change the vote of someone else.
(3) Verifiability. Each voter can verify whether his or
her vote has been counted properly, but cannot prove to
anyone else how he or she is voting.
(4) Fairness. Nobody can obtain a partial vote tally
before the end of the protocol.
(5) Eligibility. Only eligible voters can vote.
In the past decades, a number of voting protocols pur-
suing above properties have been proposed. The first vot-
ing protocol that guarantees voting privacy was proposed
∗ gaof@bupt.edu.cn
by Chaum in 1981 [2]. Since then various voting pro-
tocols based on some cryptographic primitives, such as
homomorphic encryption and blind signature, were pro-
posed; a selection of protocols are reviewed in [3]. Most
of them adopt public-key cryptographic primitives like
large integer factorization and discrete logarithm. How-
ever, the found of quantum algorithm makes them not
uncrackable anymore [4, 5]. To battle with the power
of quantum computer, quantum cryptography was born
to encrypt information based upon principle of quantum
mechanics. Surprisely, some of these fundamental princi-
ples like no-cloning theorem and the observer effect could
guarantee unconditional security. Since the first quan-
tum key distribution protocol was proposed in 1984 by
Bennett and Brassard [6], a variety of quantum crypto-
graphic protocols have been proposed, including those
for key distribution [7], secret sharing [8, 9], coin flipping
[10, 11], private query [12–15], and so on.
In recent years, researchers have investigated how to
use quantum mechanics to preserve the anonymity of
senders and receivers in communication tasks. The first
quantum protocol to anonymously broadcast classical
bits and qubits was proposed by Christandl and Wehner
[16]. Subsequently, much attention has been paid to
perform anonymous voting by using quantum principle.
Since a quantum anonymous voting protocol [3] was pre-
sented by Vaccaro et al. in 2007, several quantum anony-
mous voting protocols [17–19] based on entangled states
have been put forward. Afterwards, Horoshko and Kilin
[20] gave a quantum anonymous voting protocol which
simply utilized single-particle qubit states to vote and
Bell states to check the anonymity. More recently, a se-
ries of quantum anonymous voting protocols based on
continuous variables were proposed in [21]. However,
these protocols are function-limited from two aspects: (1)
most of them only consider two candidates; (2) most of
2them are designed to achieve only the property of privacy
and the other properties are rarely pursed. In special, the
property of self-tallying was proposed in classical voting
protocol by Kiayias and Yung [22], who is interested in
the voting result, can tally votes by himself or herself.
The functionality of self-tallying avoids the introducing
a third party thus reducing the potential risk of security.
As far as we know all previous quantum anonymous vot-
ing protocols do not have this property, which needs at
least one third party to tally votes, and most of them
neglect the cheating of third party. e.g., the third party
tampers with the voting results.
Is there a quantum voting protocol overcome the above
limitations and satisfied all these favorable properties.
Actually, it is an interesting question. Here in this paper,
we propose the first quantum anonymous voting proto-
col for any candidates which not only meet privacy, non-
resusability, verifiability, fairness, but also has another
property, self-tallying. With slightly generalization, we
show that our protocol can be used for any anonymous
multi-party computation task. This paper is structured
as follows. In Sect. II, we introduce two kinds of en-
tangled quantum states which will be the key resources
to our protocol. We present our self-tallying quantum
anonymous voting (SQAV) protocol in Sect. III. Then
we analyze the security of our protocol in Sect. IV.
In Sect. V, we generalize our protocol to anonymous
multi-party computation and briefly discuss two possible
applications. Finally we discuss the self-tallying, non-
reusablitity, verifiability and fairness of our protocol in
the Discussion. We draw our conclusion in the last sec-
tion.
II. QUANTUM RESOURCES OF THE
PROTOCOL
The security of our SQAV protocol relies on the
fact that we use two classes of quantum multiparticle
entangled states to distribute the ballot boxes and index
numbers to each voter. In this section we introduce
these two states and some properties of them, which we
will be use in our protocol.
Consider a system with m levels with computational
basis {|j〉C , j = 0, 1, · · · ,m − 1}. The fourier basis
{|j′〉F , j = 0, 1, · · · ,m − 1}, which can be obtained by
applying fourier operation on computational basis, is de-
fined as
|j′〉F = F|j〉C = 1√
m
m−1∑
k=0
exp(
2πijk
m
)|k〉C . (1)
Now we give the first quantum entangled state in our
protocol, which has been dexterously applied to imple-
ment the tasks of anonymous voting [18] and anonymous
ranking [23].
The m level n-particle state |Xn〉 is defined as
|Xn〉 = 1
m
n−1
2
∑
n−1∑
k=0
jk mod m=0
|j0〉C |j1〉C · · · |jn−1〉C ,(2)
where |jk〉 is the state of jth particle in the computational
state and jk ∈ Zm := {0, 1, · · · ,m− 1}.
|Xn〉 has an interesting property that it has the form
of GHZ state in the fourier basis,
|Xn〉 = 1√
m
m−1∑
j=0
|j′〉F |j′〉F · · · |j′〉F . (3)
Therefore |Xn〉 has two nice properties. (1) When
the state is measured in the computational basis, the
summation of the outcomes of each particle modulus m
is equal to zero. (2) When the state is measured in the
fourier basis, the outcomes of each particle are always
the same. To take advantage of above two properties
to protect the voting process being eavesdropped or
attacked, we need to use the following result [23].
Theorem 1 A n-particle m-level quantum state is
in the form of |Xn〉 if and only if both of the following
two conditions are true: (1) when each particle is
measured in the computational basis, the sum over all
the n measurement outcomes modulo m is equal to zero;
(2) when each particle is measured in the fourier basis,
the measurement outcomes are all the same.
The other quantum entangled states we will use in the
voting protocol is defined as follows.
A n-level n-particle singlet state |Sn〉 is defined as
|Sn〉 ≡ 1√
n!
∑
S∈Pnn
(−1)τ(S)|s0〉|s1〉 · · · |sn−1〉. (4)
Here Pnn is the set of all permutations of Zn :=
{0, 1, · · · , n− 1}, S is a permutation (or sequence) in the
form S = s0s1 · · · sn−1. τ(S), named inverse number, is
defined as the number of transpositions of pairs of ele-
ments of S that must be composed to place the elements
in canonical order, 012 · · ·n− 1.
|Sn〉 is n-lateral rotationally invariant, which means
the measurements of all particles are all different in any
basis [24]. In the Appendix. A we give a proof of this
property. Specifically,
|Sn〉C = eiφ|Sn〉F , (5)
where φ is a phase factor. Again this property will be
exploited to ensure the security of the voting protocol
through following theorem.
Theorem 2 A n-particle n-level quantum state is
in the form of |Sn〉, if and only if the following is
satisfied: whenever the state is measured in the compu-
tational basis or the fourier basis, the permutation of the
outcomes of n particles {s0, s1, · · · , sn−1} is a random
element of the set Pnn .
We give a proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix. B.
3III. QUANTUM ANONYMOUS VOTING
PROTOCOL
We first briefly outline our quantum anonymous vot-
ing protocol before delving into details. Assume there
are n voters labeled as V0, V1, · · · , Vn−1. Each voter can
vote for m candidates labeled by integer 0, 1, · · · ,m− 1.
Our protocol consists of three steps. First, the entangled
state |Xn〉 is distributed to n voters. Thus each voter gets
n secret ‘ballot boxes’, each of which contains a random
number, called the ballot number. Then the entangled
state |Sn〉 is distributed to n voters. Thus each voter
gets a random number called index number, which de-
cides which ballot box each voter will use for their voting.
Second, each voter casts a vote to his or her indicated
ballot box anonymously and all voters open all ballot
boxes at the same time. Finally, a random permutation
of all votes is appear and any party, who is interested
in the voting result, can obtain a copy of permutation
thus having the voting result. The details of our proto-
col are presented as follows and the communications in
our protocol are shown in Fig. 1.
A. Procedure of the protocol
Step 1. Distributing secret ballot boxes.
(1.1) Prepare quantum states.
One of n voters is chosen randomly to prepare n + nδ0
copies of quantum state |Xn〉, where δ0 is the security
strength. Without loss of the generality, we assume
V0 is appointed as the distributor. The jth copy of
state |Xn〉 lives in the Hilbert space of n particles,
pj,0, pj,1, · · · , pj,n−1. Therefore we have a particle
matrix, pj,k with 0 ≤ j ≤ n+ nδ0 − 1, 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
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FIG. 1. Communications in our protocol. For simplicity, com-
munications in the eavesdropping checks are not considered.
The dashed lines represent quantum channels and the solid
lines represent classical simultaneous broadcast channels.
(1.2) Distribute to each voter
The distributor V0 sends each column of the particle
matrix, Sk = {p0,k, p1,k, · · · , pn+nδ0−1,k}, to each voter
Vk (V0 keeps S0).
(1.3) Security test
After each voter has received his or her particle sequence,
each voter as the checker performs the security check
processes to ensure the state distributed is intact. Start
from voter V0 (the order does not matter), he or she
randomly picks out δ0 particles as the test particles,
~p0test = pi0,0pi1,0...piδ0−1,0 . (6)
V0 also needs to choose randomly from computational
basis or fourier basis with uniform distribution for each
test state, in which he or she will measure his or her test
particles with chosen basis. Then he or she publishes the
row index of his or her test particles and the measurement
basis he or she chosen to do the measurement. After
receiving this information, all other voters are required
to measure their particles with the same row index,
~pktest = pi0,kpi1,k...piδ0−1,k, k = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1 . (7)
in the basis picked by the checker V0. In other words,
the i0th, i1th, · · · , iδ0−1th copies of |Xn〉 are samples
and measured in either the computational basis or
fourier basis. Then all voters send their measurement
outcomes to the checker V0 in the order designed by V0.
Let’s label the results of measuring each test particle
as rij ,k. If V0 chooses the computational basis, he or
she then needs to check if
n−1∑
j=0
rij ,k mod m = 0. If
V0 chooses the fourier basis, he or she needs to verify
whether rij ,0, rij ,1, · · · , rij ,n−1 are all same. If the
test is failed, V0 informs the other voters to abort the
protocol. If the test is passed, the same test proce-
dure is performed by the next checker. Repeat the
same procedure until the test performed by each voter
is passed or abort the protocol in some intermediate step.
(1.4) Generate ballot numbers
If the security test passes, each voter now has n particles
left after discarding all test particles. Each voter then
measures his or her n particles in the computational
basis. This will generate n ballot numbers for each
voter. Ballot numbers of all voters form a ballot matrix,
rj,k ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m− 1}. The kth colomn are the private
ballot numbers for Vk. Since the security is passed, each
left copy of |Xn〉 is intact, according to theorem 1, ballot
numbers must satisfy the condition
n−1∑
k=0
rj,k mod m = 0 . (8)
for j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1.
Step 2. Distributing secret indexes.
4(2.1) Prepare quantum states.
Similarly to step (1.1), one of n voters is chosen
randomly to prepare 1 + nδ1 copies of quantum state
|Sn〉, where δ1 is the security strength. The jth copy
of state |Sn〉 lives in the Hilbert space of n particles,
tj,0, tj,1, · · · , tj,n−1. Therefore we have a particle matrix,
tj,k with 0 ≤ j ≤ nδ1, 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
(2.2) Distribute to each voter
The distributor sends each column of the particle matrix,
Tk = {t0,k, t1,k, · · · , tnδ1,k}, to the voter Vk .
(2.3) Security test
After each voter has received his or her particle se-
quence, each voter performs the security check processes
to ensure the state distributed is intact. Start from voter
V0 (the order does not matter), he or she randomly picks
out δ1 particles as the test particles,
~t0test = ti0,0, ti1,0, · · · , tiδ1−1,0 . (9)
V0 also needs to choose randomly from computational
basis or fourier basis with uniform distribution for each
test particle, in which he or she will measure his or her
test particle with chosen basis. Then he or she publishes
the row index of his or her test particles and the corre-
sponding measurement basis he or she chosen to do the
measurement. After receiving this information, all other
voters are required to measure their particles with the
same row index,
~tktest = ti0,k, ti1,k, · · · , tiδ1−1,k , (10)
for k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1 in the basis picked by the
checker V0 and send their measurement outcomes to
the checker V0 in the order appointed by V0. That is,
the i0th, i1th, · · · , iδ1−1th copies of |Sn〉 are measured
in either the computational basis or the fourier basis.
Label the results of measuring each test particle as
dij ,k. No matter V0 choose the computational basis
or the fourier basis, he or she then needs to check if
{dij ,0, dij ,1, · · · , dij ,n−1} ∈ Pnn according to theorem
2. If the test is passed, the same test procedure is
performed by the next checker. If the test is failed, V0
informs the other voters to abort the protocol. The
same procedure is repeated until the test performed by
each voter is passed or the protocol is aborted in some
certain intermediate step.
(2.4) Generate index numbers
If the security test passes and then discards all test
particles, each voter now has only one particle left. Each
voter then measures his or her particle in the compu-
tational basis. This will generate an index number for
each voter. Index numbers of all voters form an index
array, dk ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m− 1}. dk indicates anonymously
that dkth ballot box is the box for Vk to cast vote. Since
the security has tested, the only left copy of |Sn〉 is in-
tact according to theorem 2. Here d0, d1, · · · , dn−1 ∈ Pnn .
Step 3. Vote casting.
(3.1) Vote casting
After steps 1 and 2, each voter Vk has n ballot numbers,
r0,k, r1,k, · · · , rn−1,k, and one index number, dk. Now
voter Vk votes to the candidate vk ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m − 1},
by adding vk to rdk,k. He or she then renews ballot
numbers r′jk = (r
′
0,k, r
′
1,k, · · · , r′n−1,k), in which
r′j,k =
{
rj,k + vk mod m if j = dk ,
rj,k if j 6= dk .
(11)
All voters publish all the updated ballot numbers
through simulation broadcast channels [25, 26]. At last
we have a vote matrix, r′j,k, which is available for every
party at the same time.
(3.2) Self-tallying
With the vote matrix, each party, who is inter-
ested in the voting result, can count the votes for each
candidate. They take the summation of each row,
Rj =
n−1∑
k=0
r
′
j,k mod m , (12)
=
n−1∑
k=0
rj,k + vk0 . (13)
Here dk0 = j. Therefore {R0, R1, · · · , Rn−1} is a per-
mutation of the votes {v0, v1, · · · , vn−1}. The number of
votes each candidate got is given by
Ni =
∑
Rj=i
1 , (14)
for i = 0, 1, · · · ,m− 1.
(3.3) Security check
Each voter Vk needs to verify that Rdk = vk. If
the answer is yes, it indicates that his or her vote is
counted correctly; otherwise the protocol is aborted
since the voting step is compromised.
B. Example
To illustrate the protocol, we give a simple example
(see Table. I) with n = 4 voters and m = 3 candidates.
For simplicity, we assume there is no eavesdrop or attack
happened. Thus we ignore the security tests (steps (1.3),
(2.3) and (3.3)). After executing step 1, suppose ballot
matrix held by 4 voters are
rj,k =

0 1 2 0
2 2 1 1
1 0 2 0
0 1 1 1
 . (15)
5After step 2, assume the index numbers are
dk = (1, 0, 3, 2) . (16)
Then in step 3, assume the four voters V0, V1, V2 and V3
cast votes
vk = (1, 2, 1, 0). (17)
The voting and self-tallying process are described in Ta-
ble. I. The final published results are
Rj = (2, 1, 0, 1) (18)
which is indeed a permutation of the votes vk as we ex-
pected.
Example of QAVP
V0 V1 V2 V3 Rj
r
′
0,k 0 1+2 2 0 2
r
′
1,k 2+1 2 1 1 1
r
′
2,k 1 0 2 0+0 0
r
′
3,k 0 1 1+1 1 1
TABLE I. A simple example of QAVP with n = 4 and m = 3.
Each voter adds his or her votes to the ballot assigned by
his or her index number. The tallying results are calculated
according to Eq. (12).
IV. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Privacy is the primary property of a SQAV protocol.
In this section, we focus on discussing the privacy of our
SQAV and other properties will be given in section VI.
Generally, the top priority is to protect the privacy of
each voter, namely no outsider or voters should know
which vote is cast by whom, except the one by himself or
herself. In our SQAV, the attacker could be an outside
eavesdropper, one dishonest voters [27, 28] or the ad-
versary which concludes some dishonest voters. If an at-
tacker successfully eavesdrops the ballot random numbers
or index number of the voter Vk without being detected,
he or she can easily know which candidate Vk votes for.
Therefore, preserving privacy in our SQAV requires pre-
venting ballot numbers and index numbers from being
eavesdropped. The security tests in steps (1.3) and (2.3)
are designed to protect the ballot matrix, index array and
the voting process from being compromised.
A. Outside eavesdropper
For outside eavesdropper, Eve could intercept the Sk
or Tk during step (1.2) or (2.2). Let’s consider that Eve
intercepts arbitrary x particles she would like to in Sk. If
x < n, then there is a chance that all x particles are hap-
pen to be among the n particles which are not included
in the tests. Actually the probability of this happening
is
Pe =
(
n
x
)/(n+ nδ0
x
)
=
n!
(n− x)!
(n+ nδ0 − x)!
(n+ nδ0)!
=
n−x+1∏
k=n
k
k + nδ0
(19)
∼ O(( 1
δ0
)x) , (20)
which is approaching to zero if we make the security
strength δ0 large enough. Actually the more particles Eve
intercepts, the faster the probability that she could pass
the security check goes to zero. Similarly we could argue
that the probability of Eve intercepting and modifying Tk
in Step 2 without being found is negligible. Therefore,
for large enough δ0, δ1, the disturbed particles cannot
escape from the security tests in steps (1.3) and (2.3).
Let’s consider another scenario. Assume Eve inter-
cepts and modifies pj0,k in Sk thus the j0th copy of |Xn〉
is changed. Suppose that the new state due to Eve’s dis-
turbance is |φe〉. The probability of all security tests in
Step (2.3) are passed is
Pe = (
1
2
PC +
1
2
PF )
nδ0 , (21)
where
PC =
∑
∑
k jkmod m=0
|〈φe|j0, j1, · · · , jn−1〉C |2 , (22)
PF =
m−1∑
j=0
|〈φe|j, j, · · · , j〉F |2 . (23)
Since 〈φe|Xn〉 6= 1 according to theorem 1, PC +PF < 1.
Therefore, for large enough δ0,
Pe → 0 . (24)
The argument for Eve modifying the index number is
similar, based on theorem 2, if δ1 is large enough Eve
cannot pass the security tests. In summary, as long as
the security strength δ0, δ1 are large enough, the attack
from outside eavesdropper can be prevented.
B. The dishonest voters cannot eavesdrop the
ballot numbers without being detected
In the step 1, to gain the information of ballot numbers
of honest voters, the dishonest voters could cooperate to
attack the particles during their transmission in step (1.2)
and announce the wrong results to avoid being detected
by the honest voters in step (1.3). Since V0 is the only
voter who prepares and distributes the quantum states, it
seems that V0 plays a different role from the other voters.
6To analyze the possible attacks from dishonest voters in
more detail, two cases: (1) V0 is honest and (2) V0 is
dishonest, are considered.
For the case (1), without loss of generality, we sup-
pose there are l dishonest voters, Vi0 , Vi1 , · · · , Vil−1 . The
most general attack by the dishonest voters is that they
intercept some particles any they would like to during
the transmission from V0 to honest voters and then they
perform an unitary operation (attack operation) on in-
tercepted particles and an auxiliary system to yield a
new state, denoted by |Φ〉, of the composite system. To
avoid being detected by the honest voters in step (1.3)
when they measure their particles in their hands with the
fourier basis and the measurement outcomes are required
to be the same, |Φ〉 should be in the form
|Φ〉 =
m−1∑
j=0
|j′〉0|j′〉j0 · · · |j′〉jn−l−2 |φj〉
√
m
, (25)
where |φj〉 are the states of the composite system of l
particles sent from V0 to the dishonest voters and the
auxiliary system (denoted by system E0), and the sub-
scripts 0, j0, j1, · · · , jn−l−2 represent the particles held by
honest voters V0, Vj0 , Vj1 , · · · , Vjn−l−2 . It can be rewrit-
ten in the computational basis as
|Φ〉 =
m−1∑
k0,kj0 ,··· ,kjn−l−2=0
|k0〉|kj0〉 · · · |kjn−l−2〉
m
n−l+1
2
⊗|ϕk0kj0 ···kjn−l−2 〉, (26)
where |ϕk0kj0 ···kjn−l−2 〉 =
m−1∑
j=0
exp (
2piij(k0+kj0+···+kjn−l−2 )
m )|φj〉 are the unnor-
malized state vectors of system E0. The dishonest
voters could measure the system E0 and obtain some
|ϕk0kj0 ···kjn−l−2 〉 to infer the measurement outcomes
k0kj0 · · · kjn−l−2 of honest voters in step (1.4). From the
form of |ϕk0kj0 ···kjn−l−2 〉, it is easy to see that, for any two
different outcomes k0kj0 · · · kjn−l−2 and k′0k′j0 · · · k′jn−l−2
such that k0kj0 · · · kjn−l−2 = k′0k′j0 · · · k′jn−l−2 mod m
, |ϕk0kj0 ···kjn−l−2 〉 = |ϕk′0k′j0 ···k′jn−l−2 〉. This means
that the dishonest voters can only at most know the
information about the sum k0kj0 · · · kjn−l−2 mod m by
measuring the system E0. However, this attack is trivial
in the sense that without any eavesdropping attack the
dishonest voter can cooperate to directly infer the sum
of measurement outcomes (ballot numbers) of honest
voters after executing the step (1.4).
For the case (2) that V0 is dishonest, we assume there
are other l dishonest voters Vi0 , Vi1 , · · · , Vil−1 . The most
general attack for them are similar to the case (1). The
only difference could be that the dishonest voters can di-
rectly prepare and distribute fake states to the honest
voters instead of intercepting the particles. To avoid be-
ing detected by honest voters, these states should be of
the form similar to Eq. (25) or (26). From the above
analysis for case (1), it is not hard to draw the same con-
clusion as case (1) that, in order to avoid being detected,
the dishonest voters can only perform a trivial attack to
obtain the sum of ballot numbers of the honest voters.
C. The dishonest voters cannot eavesdrop the
index numbers without being detected
In step 2, to eavesdrop the information of index num-
bers of honest voters, the dishonest voters could also at-
tack the particles during their transmissions in step (2.2)
and announce the wrong results to avoid being detected
by the honest voters in step (2.3). Just as analyzing
eavesdropping the ballot numbers in the last subsection,
we also consider two cases: (1) V0 is honest and (2) V0 is
dishonest.
For the case (1), we also assume there are l dishonest
voters, Vi0 , Vi1 , · · · , Vil−1 . The most general attack for
them is that, they first intercept some transmitted parti-
cles in step (2.2), entangle them with an auxiliary system
prepared in advance and then return the operated parti-
cles to honest voters. The state of the whole composite
system is denoted by |Ψ〉. To elude detection in step
(2.3), it is required that all the measurement outcomes
should be distinct when measuring each particle held by
honest voter in the fourier basis, and thus |Ψ〉 should be
in the form
|Ψ〉 =
∑
S∈Pn−ln
(−1)τ(S)F⊗(n−l)|S〉√
|Pn−ln |
⊗ |uS〉, (27)
where S = s0sj0 · · · sjn−l−2 , |uS〉 are the states of com-
posite system (denoted by E1) of l particles sent to
the dishonest voters and auxiliary system, Pn−ln =
{x0x1 · · ·xn−l−1|x0, x1, · · · , xn−l−1 ∈ Zn, ∀j 6= k, xj 6=
xk} is the set of all the (n − l)-permutations of Zn
and |Pn−ln | = n!l! is its size. Pn−ln can be divided into(
n
n−l
)
= n!(n−l)!l! subsets, each one corresponding to the
set of all the (n−l)! permutations of a (n−l)-combination
of Zn. In addition, any two states |uS0〉 and |uS1〉 such
that S0 ∈ Pn−l,w0n , S1 ∈ Pn−l,w1n and w0 6= w1 should
be orthogonal to each other, i.e., 〈uS0 |uS1〉 = 0; if not,
the dishonest voters cannot deterministically know sub-
set Pn−l,wn in which the honest voters’ measurement out-
comes are, and thus cannot announce the correct mea-
surement outcomes to avoid being detected. Rewriting
|Ψ〉 in the computational basis, we have
|Ψ〉 = n
−n−l2√
|Pn−ln |
∑
T∈Rn−ln
|T 〉 ⊗ |vT 〉, (28)
where T = t0tj0 · · · tjn−l−2 , Rn−ln =
7{x0x1 · · ·xn−l−1|x0, x1, · · · , xn−l−1 ∈ Zn} and
|vT 〉 =
∑
S∈Pn−ln
(−1)τ(S) exp(2πi(s0t0 +
∑n−l−2
k=0 sjk tjk)
n
)|uS〉
=
∑
w
∑
S∈Pn−l,wn
(−1)τ(S) exp(2πi(s0t0 +
∑n−l−2
k=0 sjk tjk)
n
)|uS〉
are the unnormalized state vectors of system E1. To
avoid being detected by the honest voters who measure
their particles in the computational basis in the step (2.3)
and the measurement outcomes are required to be dis-
tinct, two conditions should be satisfied: (a) in Eq. (28)
there is no terms |vT 〉 for T /∈ Pn−ln , or equivalently,
for T ∈ Qn−ln = {x0x1 · · ·xn−l−1|x0, x1, · · · , xn−l−1 ∈
Zn, ∃j 6= k, xj = xk}; (b) any two states |vT0〉 and
|vT1〉 for T0 ∈ Pn−l,w0n , T1 ∈ Pn−l,w1n and w0 6= w1
should be orthogonal to each other, i.e., 〈vT0 |vT1〉 =
0. Here we focus on analyzing what |Ψ〉 (in Eq.
(28)) should be to satisfy the condition (a). Since
〈uS0 |uS1〉 = 0 for S0 ∈ Pn−l,w0n , S1 ∈ Pn−l,w1n and
w0 6= w1, the condition (a) is equivalent to the one that∑
S∈Pn−l,wn (−1)τ(S) exp(
2pii(s0t0+
∑n−l−2
k=0 sjk tjk )
n )|uS〉 = 0
for arbitrary w and arbitrary T ∈ Qn−ln . To satisfy
this condition, for arbitrary w, all the |uS〉 such that
S ∈ Pn−l,wn should be equal (denoted by |uw〉), which is
implied by the the corollary 1 of Appendix. Thus |vT 〉
can be rewritten as
|vT 〉 =
∑
w
∑
S∈Pn−l,wn
(−1)τ(S)
exp(
2πi(s0t0 +
∑n−l−2
k=0 sjk tjk)
n
)|uw〉. (29)
Once the dishonest voters successfully elude the eaves-
dropping check process in step (2.3), they could measure
the system E1 and get some |vT 〉 to infer the index num-
bers T = t0tj0 , · · · tjn−l−2 of honest voters in step (2.4).
However, from the form of |vT 〉 in Eq. (29), it is easy to
verify that for any two sequences T0, T1 which are in the
same subset Pn−l,wn , |vT0〉 = |vT1 〉. Therefore, the dis-
honest voters can at most know the information about
which subset (i.e., w) the honest voters’ index numbers
are in. However, this general entangle-measure attack is
trivial in the sense that without any attack the dishonest
can cooperate to obtain this information.
For the case (2) that V0 is dishonest, the general at-
tack performed by them would be the same as the case
(1) except that the dishonest voters would prepare and
distribute the fake states in the form similar to the Eq.
(27) to the honest voters instead of intercepting the par-
ticles in step (2.2). According the analysis in case (1), we
can conclude that the dishonest voters cannot obtain the
index numbers of honest voters without being detected.
V. GENERALIZE TO ANONYMOUS
MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION
One important feature of SQAV is to make each vote
open without any relation with any voter. Actually it
provides a mechanism to implement a class of multi-
party tasks. That is, our protocol can be as useful as
for voting as long as a multi-party activity requires
to broadcast the data of each party anonymously.
Therefore we define a more general class of problem,
anonymous multi-party computation (AMC) as follows.
Definition Anonymous multi-party computation
is a task to compute a function of the form
f(y00 , · · · , yi0−10 , y01, · · · , yi1−11 , y0n−1, · · · , yin−1−1n−1 ) by
n parties. The function f is invariant under the permu-
tation of integer inputs {yik}. Each party, say Pk, feeds
y0k, · · · , yij−1k in the function anonymously and obtains
the result unassisted the other person. All the inputs are
bounded by 0 ≤ yk < m.
The protocol for AMC is very similar to the SQAV.
Step 1. P0 prepares n¯+nδ2 copies ofm level n-particle
state |Xn〉, where n¯ =
∑n−1
k=0 ik. Then P0 keeps the
first i0 columns S0, S1, · · · , Si0−1 to himself and then dis-
tribute S∑k−1
t=0 it−1, · · · , S∑kt=0 it−1 to Pk. After distribu-
tion, each party Pk repeats the security procedure in step
(1.3). If all n tests are passed, each parity Pk measures
his or her n¯ particles so again there is a ballot column
rj,k =

r0,k
r1,k
...
rn¯−1,k
 . (30)
Step 2. P0 prepares 1+nδ3 copies of |Sn¯〉 and distribute
T∑k−1
t=0 it−1, · · · , T∑kt=0 it−1 to Pk. Again to protect from
attack, each party is required to choose δ3 copies of |Sn¯〉
to exam if |Sn¯〉 is intact. If all tests are passed, each
party Pk measures the remaining particles with computa-
tion basis and then there are index arrays d0,k, · · · , dik,k,
where di,k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n¯− 1}.
Step 3. Finally each party addes each of his or her
data to the ballot box decided by the corresponding index
number. And we have a data matrix r′j,k. Finally every
party could calculate
Rj =
n∑
k=0
r′j,k mod m , (31)
{Rj} is a permutation of all the data
⋃n−1
j=0 y
i
j . Therefore
all the data are broadcasted anonymously.
Step 4. With holding all data, each party can obtain
the result of
f(y00, ..., y
i0−1
0 , y
0
1 , ..., y
i1−1
1 , y
0
n−1, · · · , yin−1−1n−1 )
through simple calculation by himself or herself.
8Actually, AMC is a subclass of secure multi-party com-
putation (SMC) problem, in which a number of par-
ties also jointly compute a function over their inputs
while the inputs are kept private. SMC focuses on
function result without publication of the inputs of all
parties. To illustrate it, we give a simple example in
which three parties want to jointly compute the func-
tion f(y0, y1, y2) = y0 + y1 + y2 over their inputs y0, y1
and y2. Supposing y0 = 2, y1 = 3, y2 = 6, by SMC,
they have the result f(y0, y1, y2) = 11, but any party can
only know the sum of the inputs of the other two parties.
However, by AMC, in addition to obtaining the result
f(y0, y1, y2) = 11, every party also get a permutation of
the original inputs of the other , for example, (3, 6, 2)
and the index of his or her own input is only known to
himself or herself; as a result, P0 knows (y1, y2) = (3, 6)
or (6, 3), P1 knows (y0, y2) = (2, 6) or (6, 3), P2 knows
(y0, y1) = (2, 3) or (3, 2). However, for some particular
tasks, the function result leads to open all inputs. In this
sense, there is no difference between AMC and SMC. In
the following, we give two examples to explain this.
A. Anonymous broadcast
The simplest application of AMC is to implement
anonymous broadcast (AB). AB channels are primitives
of many anonymous communication protocols.
An anonymous n-party broadcast task [16] is to pub-
lish the datum yk ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m− 2} held by sender Pk
anonymously and all parties obtain yk at the same time.
In this scenario, the protocal are basically the same as
of SQAV with m candidate and n voters. If a sender
would like to broadcast message y, he or she just needs
to ‘vote’ for the ‘candidate’ y following the protocol in
Sec. III. However, if a party does not want to send any
message, he or she just needs to ‘vote’ for the ‘candi-
date’ ¯m− 1. Finally each Rk ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m− 2} will be
the message sent by one of the senders. Therefore, each
sender broadcasts the intended message anonymously.
B. Anonymous ranking
Anonymous ranking (AR) [23] is an important problem
in AMC and has significant practical applications [23].
An AR task generally involves two steps. 1) each party
needs to broadcast his or her data yk = {y0k, y1k, ..., yik−1k }
to the community anonymously. 2) Each one could rank
the published data by himself or herself. Obviously the
first step could be done safely by using our AMC pro-
tocol. Finally instead of self-tallying like in SQAV, self-
ranking is proceeded.
VI. DISCUSSION
We discuss in detail how our SQVA ensures privacy in
Sec. IV. However, except being able to keep privacy for
each voter, our protocol has several other nice properties
which are not fulfilled by other existing protocols [3, 17–
21].
1) Self-tally. In our protocol, any voter or other third
party who is interested in voting results can tally the
votes by himself or herself by counting the votes in {Rj}
in step (3.2). Then through simple calculation, they can
obtain the voting result.
2) Non-reusability. In our voting protocol, each voter
cannot cast more than one votes. More specifically, each
voter cannot vote one candidate more than once or vote
more than one candidates. Suppose voter Vk wants to
vote twice vk and ve in step (3.1). To do so, he or she
first casts vk to the ballot box decided by his or her index
number, dk as usual, then he or she casts ve to another
ballot box labeled by de. However since the index array
{dk} is a permutation of Zn, de must be the index number
of another voter Vj . Therefore Vj will find that Rdj =
vj+ve 6= vj mod m and knows that someone cheats thus
aborting the voting protocol. Our protocol ensures that
each voter only has one vote and he or she can only use
it once.
3) Verifiability. In our protocol step (3.3), each voter
can verify if his or her vote has been modified by attack-
ers. As long as Vk finds out Rdk 6= vk, he or she knows
that his or her vote has not been counted correctly.
4) Fairness. If a voter could know some useful infor-
mation about other votes beforehand, he or she might
change his or her mind thus voting for another candidate
to his or her benefit. In our protocol, the voters vote
only in the step (3) and the vote tally is obtained by do-
ing statistics on Rk which is the sum over the numbers
r′j,k. However, the numbers r
′
j,k are announced via simul-
taneous broad channels in the step (3.1), which means
that each voter cannot acquire the other voters’ informa-
tion on r′j,k and thus cannot obtain a partial vote tally
beforehand. Therefore, fairness can be maintained.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a quantum protocol for implement-
ing the task of anonymous voting with the help of two
entangled quantum states, |Xn〉 and |Sn〉. Through our
protocol, any individual party can acquire a permutation
of all the votes, which makes anyone can tally the votes by
himself or herself without resorting to a third-party tally
man. The protocol has been demonstrated to possess the
properties of privacy, self-tallying, non-reusability, verifi-
ability and fairness. We also generalize our SQAV to the
more general AMC task. Our generalized protocol could
let each party broadcast his or her data anonymously and
safely to be further fed into AMC function.
9An interesting open question is whether and how our
protocol can be used to implement more tasks on AMC or
SMC. This deserves further investigations in the future.
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Appendix A: Proof |Sn〉 is n-lateral rotationally
invariant
Property 1 A n dimensional qudit state on Hilbert
space Hn is the superposition of its computational basis
{|i〉} i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n− 1} . Consider a state of n such
particles on H⊗nn ,
|Sn〉 =
∑
S∈Pnn
(−)τ(S)|S〉 (A1)
≡
∑
S∈Pnn
(−)τ(S)|s0s1, · · · , sn−1〉. (A2)
Consider another basis {|i′〉} connected with the compu-
tational basis by a unitary transformation U ,
|i〉 =
∑
j
Uji|j′〉 . (A3)
Then in this new basis the state |Sn〉 takes the same form
up to a global phase factor φ:
|Sn〉 = eiφ
∑
M∈Pnn
(−)τ(M)|M ′〉 (A4)
≡ eiφ
∑
M∈Pnn
(−)τ(M)|m′0m′1 · · ·m′n−1〉 . (A5)
Here Pnn = {x0x1 · · ·xn−1|x0, x1, · · · , xn−1 ∈ Zn, ∀j 6=
k, xj 6= xk} and the phase factor is given by
eiφ = det(U) . (A6)
Proof : Expand Eq.(A2) in the new basis by using the
unitary transformation Eq.(A3), we have
|Sn〉 =
∑
S∈Pnn
(−)τ(S)
n−1∑
m0=0
Um0,s0 |m′0〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗
n−1∑
mn−1=0
Umn−1,sn−1 |m′n−1〉 (A7)
= (
∑
M∈Pnn
+
∑
M/∈Pnn
)
[ ∑
S∈Pnn
(−)τ(S)Um0,s0Um1,s1 · · ·
Umn−1,sn−1
]|M〉 (A8)
= (
∑
M∈Pnn
+
∑
M/∈Pnn
) det(Umj ,si)|M〉 (A9)
ifM /∈ Pnn , ∃s 6= t such that ms = mt, then there are two
same columns for matrix Umj,si , that is, Ums,si = Umt,si .
Therefore detUmj ,si = 0 and we have
|Sn〉 =
∑
M∈Pnn
det(Umj ,si)|M〉
=
∑
M∈Pnn
(−)τ(M) det(Uj,si)|M〉
=
∑
M∈Pnn
(−)τ(M) det(U)|M〉
= eiφ
∑
M∈Pnn
(−)τ(M)|M〉 (A10)

Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2
To prove the theorem 2, we first give two lemmas and
one corollary.
Lemma 1 Letting q be an arbitrary element of
{1, 2, · · · , n − 1}, s0, s1, · · · , sq−1 ∈ Zn are distinct, if∑q−1
j=0 exp(
2piisj t
n )αj = 0 always holds for any t ∈ Zn, we
have α0 = α1 = · · · = αq−1 = 0.
Proof : If
∑q
j=0 exp(
2piisj t
n )αj = 0 always holds for any
t ∈ Zn, we have linear equations
A

α0
α1
...
αq−1
 =

0
0
...
0
 , (B1)
where A is a n × q matrix with elements
Ajk = exp(
2pii(j−1)sk
n ) = (exp(
2piisk
n ))
j−1. Taking
the first q rows of A as a new square matrix A with
size q × q , it is easy to see that A is a Vandermonde
matrix [29]. Since s0, s1, · · · , sq−1 are distinct, the
determinant of A is non-zero and thus the rank of A is q.
10
Consequently, the above Eq. (B1) has the only solution
α0 = α1 = · · · = αq−1 = 0.
Lemma 2 Letting m be an arbitrary element of
{2, 3, · · · , n}, Rmn = {x0x1 · · ·xm−1|x0, x1, · · · , xm−1 ∈
Zn}, Pmn = {x0x1 · · ·xm−1|x0, x1, · · · , xm−1 ∈
Zn, ∀j 6= k, xj 6= xk} and Qmn =
{x0x1 · · ·xm−1|x0, x1, · · · , xm−1 ∈ Zn, ∃j 6= k, xj = xk}.
Apparently, Pmn ∩ Qmn = ∅ and Rmn = Pmn ∪ Qmn . Divide
Pmn into
(
n
m
)
= n!(n−m)!m! subsets, each one corresponding
to the set of all the m! permutations of a m-combination
of Zn, denoted by Pn,wn (w = 0, 1, · · · ,
(
n
m
) − 1). For an
arbitrary subset Pm,wn , if the equation∑
S∈Pm,wn
(−1)τ(S)
m−1∏
j=0
exp(
2πisjtj
n
)βS = 0 (B2)
holds for any t0t1 · · · tm−1 ∈ Qmn , we have that all the
βS for S ∈ Pm,wn are equal.
Proof : We use the method of induction to prove this
lemma.
For m = 2, supposing P2,wn = {sˆ0sˆ1, sˆ1sˆ0}(sˆ0 <
sˆ1), Q2n = {t0t1|t0 = t1 = t ∈ Zn} and the equa-
tion
∑
s0s1∈P2,wn (−1)τ(s0s1) exp(
2pii(s0t0+s1t1)
n )βs0s1 = 0
holds for any t0t1 ∈ Q2n. Since t0 = t1 = t, the
equation can also be written as exp(2pii(sˆ0+sˆ1)tn )βsˆ0 sˆ1 −
exp(2pii(sˆ0+sˆ1)tn )βsˆ1 sˆ0 = 0. Obviously, βsˆ0sˆ1 = βsˆ1 sˆ0 is
obtained.
We assume that for m = k and an arbitrary subset
Pk,wn , if the Eq. (B2) always holds for any t0t1 · · · tk−1 ∈
Qkn, all the βs0s1···sk−1 for s0s1 · · · sk−1 ∈ Pk,wn are equal.
Now we analyze the case for m = k + 1. We suppose
the (k+1)-combination that Pk+1,wn corresponds is the
set Sˆ = {sˆ0, sˆ1, · · · , sˆk} with sˆ0 < sˆ1 < · · · < sˆk, namely,
Pk+1,wn is the set of all the (k + 1)! permutation of the
Sˆ. In this case, observing that sp (p ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k}) can
take all the values from Sˆ in the Eq. (B2), the equation
can be written as
k∑
l=0
( ∑
S∈Pk+1,wn ,sp=sˆl
(−1)τ(S) exp(2πisˆltp
n
)
k∏
j=0,j 6=p
exp(
2πisjtj
n
)βS
)
= 0. (B3)
Noting that (−1)τ(S) = (−1)l−p(−1)τ(s0···sp−1sp+1···sk),
the Eq. (B3) can also be written as
k∑
l=0
(−1)l−p exp(2πisˆltp
n
)
( ∑
S∈Pk+1,wn ,sp=sˆl
(−1)τ(s0···sp−1sp+1···sk)
k∏
j=0,j 6=p
exp(
2πisjtj
n
)βS
)
= 0.
(B4)
We now prove that, if the Eq. (B4) holds for any
t0t1 · · · tk ∈ Qk+1n , all the βS for S ∈ Pk+1,wn are equal.
Specially, when t0 · · · tp−1tp+1 · · · tk ∈ Qkn is fixed and tp
takes every value from Zn, the Eq. (B4) always holds.
Hence, according to the lemma 1, we can derive that for
arbitrary l ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , k},∑
S∈Pk+1,wn ,sp=sˆl
(−1)τ(s0···sp−1sp+1···sk)
k∏
j=0,j 6=p
exp(
2πisjtj
n
)βs0s1···sk = 0. (B5)
Meanwhile, since the Eq. (B5) holds for arbitrary
t0 · · · tp−1tp+1 · · · tk ∈ Pk,wn , based on the previous as-
sumption for the case m = k, all the βS for S ∈ Pk+1,wn
and sp = sˆl are equal. Since l and p can take arbitrary
values from {0, 1, 2, · · · , k}, we can draw the conclusion
that for m = k + 1, if the equation (B2) holds for any
t0t1 · · · tk ∈ Qk+1n , we have that all the βS for S ∈ Pk+1,wn
are equal.
By mathematical induction above, we can derive
that for arbitrary m ∈ {2, · · · , n}, if the Eq. (B2)
holds for any t0t1 · · · tm−1 ∈ Qmn , all the βs0s1···sm−1 for
s0s1 · · · sm−1 ∈ Pm,wn are equal.
Now we give a corollary of lemma 2 below.
Corollary 1 Let m, Rmn , Pmn , Qmn and Rmn be defined as
lemma 2. For an arbitrary subset Pm,wn , if the equation
∑
s0s1···sm−1∈Pm,wn
(−1)τ(s0s1···sm−1)
m−1∏
j=0
exp(
2πisjtj
n
)~βs0s1···sm−1
= ~0 (B6)
holds for any t0t1 · · · tm−1 ∈ Qmn , where ~βs0s1···sm−1
are vectors and ~0 is zero vector, all the ~βs0s1···sm−1 for
s0s1 · · · sm−1 ∈ Pm,wn are equal.
The only difference between this corollary and
lemma 2 is that βs0s1···sm−1 is generalized to the vector
~βs0s1···sm−1 . Hence, the corollary can be directly proved.
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Now we use lemma 2 to prove theorem 2.
Proof : Restrict the measurement basis to computation
basis or fourier basis, the necessity of our theorem can
be directly obtained from the property 1.
Now we prove the sufficiency. On one hand, to satisfy
the condition that all the measurement outcomes are dis-
tinct when measuring each particle of |Θ〉 in fourier basis,
|Θ〉 must be in the form
|Θ〉 =
∑
S∈Pnn
(−1)τ(S)βS(F|s0〉)⊗ · · · ⊗ (F|sn−1〉)
=
∑
S∈Pnn
(−1)τ(S)βS(
∑
t0
exp(2piis0t0n )√
n
|t0〉)⊗ · · · ⊗ (
∑
tn−1
exp(2piisn−1tn−1n )√
n
|tn−1〉)
=
∑
t0,t1,··· ,tn−1
∑
S∈Pnn
(
(−1)τ(S)
n
n
2
n−1∏
j=0
exp(
2πisjtj
n
)βS)|t0t1 · · · tn−1〉, (B7)
where S = s0s1 · · · sn−1. On the other hand, to meet
the condition that all the measurement outcomes are dis-
tinct when measuring each particle of |Θ〉 in computa-
tion basis, the terms
∑
S∈Pnn (βS
∏n−1
j=0 exp(
2piisj tj
n )) for
t0t1 · · · tn−1 ∈ Qnn are required to be equal to zero. From
lemma 2 (when m = n), to satisfy this requirement, we
can see that all the βS for S ∈ Pnn are equal. Moreover,
to keep normalization of |Θ〉, we have
βS =
1√
n!
. (B8)
For any t0t1 · · · tn−1 ∈ Qnn, according to
the definition of square matrix determinant,∑
S∈Pnn
(−1)τ(S)
n
n
2
∏n−1
j=0 exp(
2piisj tj
n ) is in fact the de-
terminant of the n × n matrix V with elements
V jk =
exp(
2piitjk
n
)√
n
, namely,
∑
S∈Pnn
(−1)τ(S)
n
n
2
n−1∏
j=0
exp(
2πisjtj
n
) = det(V ). (B9)
Transposing pairs of rows of V to generate a new n × n
matrix V˜ with elements V˜jk =
exp( 2piijk
n
)√
n
, we have
det(V ) = (−1)τ(t0t1···tn−1) det(V˜ ). (B10)
Taking the Eqs. (B8), (B9) and (B10) to the Eq. (B7)
and discarding the terms for t0t1 · · · tn−1 ∈ Qnn in the Eq.
(B7), we have
|Θ〉 =
∑
T∈Pnn
(−1)τ(T )√
n!
|T 〉, (B11)
up to the global factor det(V˜ ), where T = t0t1 · · · tn−1.
Therefore, |Θ〉 has the same form as |Sn〉 and the theorem
2 is proved.
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